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Abstract: Phenomenology has been defined by Husserl as “theory of the 
essences of pure phenomena,” yet the ontological status of essences in 
Husserlian phenomenology is far from a settled issue. The late Husserlian 
emphasis on genetic constitution and the historicity of the lifeworld is not 
immediately reconcilable with the ‘unchangeable’ nature that is prima facie 
attributed to essences. However, the problem of the nature of ideality cannot be 
dropped from phenomenological accounts without jeopardizing the 
phenomenological enterprise as such. Through an immanent analysis of 
Husserl’s meditation on essences a positive account of their ontological status is 
provided. Essences are interpreted as ontological thresholds, primordially rooted 
in our motivated confrontation with sensuous transcendence. Essences appear as 
emergent ontological features, which are not reducible to their particular 
realizations and which exhibit a fundamental continuity between consciousness 
and being. They manifest themselves as prospectively a priori (a precondition 
for further experiences), but retrospectively a posteriori (they are founded in 
experience). Finally, essences manifest the ‘co-essential’ nature of 
consciousness and sensuous transcendence: they are the way in which we are 
motivated and constitutively bound to articulate being, which in turn is apt to be 
thus articulated.  
 




 Phenomenology has been consistently defined over time by Husserl1 as 
“theory of the essences (Wesenslehre) of pure phenomena,”2 and, indeed, 
the notion of ‘essence’ (in its various verbal realizations as Wesen, 
Essenz, Eidos, Idee, Idealität, etc.) lies at the core of the 
phenomenological project; yet, to establish the ontological status of 
                                                 
1In the following, with regard to Husserl’s quotations, I will always refer to the original 
German versions, while offering the relevant excerpts in English whenever a published 
translation is available. 
2
 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Vol. 2, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: 
Routledge, 2001), hereafter cited as “LI 2,” 343. -.Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. II. Teil 
I. Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1913, 336 (henceforth quoted as: LU II/1). See also 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 
168. Hereafter cited as Ideas I. - Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine 
Phänomenologie, Husserliana III, W. Biemel (ed.) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 
172. Hereafter cited as “Hua III” 
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essences in Husserlian phenomenology is neither an easy nor an 
uncontroversial task. Even if the dispute over realism or idealism in 
Husserl’s phenomenology is no longer as fashionable as it used to be, this 
does not mean that the ontological position of essences is a well-
established issue. Although Husserl’s writings after Ideas I decidedly 
contributed to fence off many of the accusations of ‘idealism’, which 
were at the roots of the ‘phenomenological diaspora’, still not everything 
is settled. While the stress of the late Husserl on genetic analysis and on 
the ontological role of history is up to most of the theoretical challenges 
raised by Scheler or Heidegger, such late developments are not 
straightforwardly reconcilable with the ‘unchangeable’ nature that is 
prima facie attributed to ‘essences’. At the same time, it must be stressed 
that the problem of the nature of ideality is not a problem among others in 
phenomenology, but is decisive for the whole phenomenological 
enterprise.3 As we will see, Husserl very convincingly argues that there 
must be something like ‘essences’, but, as to how we have to conceive of 
their ‘being’, their explicit determination is more often negative than 
positive: essences are said not to be spatiotemporal realities, nor mere 
psychological data, nor Platonic hypostatizations. Yet, to grasp positively 
the being of essences is much harder, and this is the task that we will try 
to approach in the following pages. 
 
§ 1. Essences, Truth and Facts 
 
 In the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1900) Husserl diffusely argues 
for the necessity to grant the existence of an ideal dimension irreducible 
to factuality. Among the various arguments that he produces, we want to 
concentrate on the one that seems to us to be the most basic and powerful: 
according to Husserl, to the extent that there is something like truth, there 
must be an ideal dimension irreducible to facts. To reach this conclusion 
we must first remember that whenever we produce a judgment, we require 
the existence of propositions verifiable in different times and contexts and 
by a plurality of different subjects. This requires the availability of 
general contents: no two actual horses are exactly the same, but we are 
able to make and share truthful judgments about horses in different 
moments and places. However, this does not establish ideal ‘horseness’ 
yet, but is just to say that we need to refer to something that preserves 
unity and identity while its determinations may change. At this point, the 
objection could be raised that the mentioned conditions for judgment (and 
truth) could just be anthropological or psychological facts, concerning the 
cognitive abilities of the human species, and that it does not involve any 
guarantee of the truly universal nature of ideas. In this sense, general 
contents or ideas could be just individual states of mind, factually present 
in the brains of a peculiar species. Consequently, some judgments could 
be true for a certain animal species, like homo sapiens, and false for 
                                                 
3
 S. Rinofner-Kreidl, Edmund Husserl: Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität (Freiburg 
[Breisgau], München: Karl Alber Verlag, 2000), 682. 
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another species, endowed with a different biological constitution4. The 
same could be actually said with reference to different individuals within 
the same biological species.  
 Yet, according to Husserl, if we regard ideas as mere facts pertinent to a 
specific biological constitution or to its accidental variations, we are 
taking a stance that is equivalent to a statement of radical scepticism: 
judgments claiming to be truthful become mere couplings of facts, in the 
brain and in the extra-cerebral world respectively, and since facts are 
individual determinations, their coupling would just be an individual 
determination in its turn. But by reducing truth to an individual 
determination, we have actually given up the concept of truth, which can 
no longer claim to be conducive to knowledge and reality. Truth as 
knowledge of reality requires a stable grasp of something endowed with 
universal validity, but, under the present presuppositions, truth turns out 
to be just an individual fact among other individual facts, irreducibly 
disjunct from each other. This means that the reduction of ideas to facts 
implies the sceptical assertion that there is no truth proper. But such an 
assertion falls under the classical criticism that applies to all skeptical 
theses (LU I, 119/ LI 1, 80): if there is no truth, you can neither assert nor 
conceive of the very content of the thesis ‘there is no truth’. Even if we 
may have the impression of thinking something meaningful when we 
conceive of the skeptical thesis, in fact this cannot be but a delusional 
representation, since here there is no room for any representation ‘true to 
the facts’. Any possible speculation about biological constitutions, 
evolutionary processes or pragmatist interpretations of cognition already 
presupposes the subsistence of a dimension irreducible to individual 
factuality. Thus, we do not really have any alternative to granting the 
existence of ideas that are not reducible to factuality, and this is what 
Husserl prima facie means by ‘essences’. 
 Yet, does the refutation of the skeptic necessarily translate into a 
positive ontological thesis about essences? Not quite, since we need at 
least to clarify two orders of questions. The first one concerns the nature 
of the relationship between truth and reality (in the widest sense): the fact 
that, in order to conceive of truth, we have to grant that entities that are 
more than individual must exist does not tell anything about the capability 
of ideas (thought in general) to account for ‘reality in itself’, whatever this 
may mean. This position, in the absence of further specifications, is 
compatible with solipsism and absolute idealism, and, indeed, it is well-
known that Husserl met with some difficulties when trying to clarify the 
relevant issues. The second point concerns the nature of the original 
opposition that primarily determines the ideal dimension: ‘essence’ is 
primarily what is not individual and not mutable, and that therefore 
enables factuality to be grasped, which is individual and mutable. This 
means that, in order to understand what the ‘essential’ character of 
                                                 
4
 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, trans. D. Moran (London: Routledge, 
2001), 79. (Hereafter cited as LI 1). - Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. I. 
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1913), 117. (Hereafter 
cited as: LU I) 
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essence is, we must clarify as much as possible what its ‘opposite’ is. Let 
us dwell first on this second order of questions. 
 In Logical Investigations Husserl defines the ideal dimension by 
opposition to the dimension of facts (Tatsachen), which are said to be 
‘individual’, ‘temporal’ and ‘empirical’. The ideal dimension turns out 
therefore to be non-individual, non-temporal (unzeitlich) (LU I 130/ LI 1 
87) and super-empirical (überempirisch) (LU I, 64/ LI 1, 48; LU II/1, 26/ 
LI 1, 184/). These three requirements are partially, but not wholly, 
overlapping. In the wake of the argument that we have recalled in support 
of the necessary subsistence of essences, they must be regarded by 
definition as non-individual. Yet, the proper meaning of such non-
individual nature can be understood only by clarifying also the super-
empirical and non-temporal nature attributed to essences. And indeed 
essences can be regarded as super-empirical and non-temporal only under 
proper qualifications. Essences must be non-temporal in the sense that 
they must not be labile and changeable: essences are what allow 
identification across the volatile flow of facts. This however does not 
imply that essences must exist, as it were, in a dimension of ‘eternity’ 
parallel and foreign to the worldly existence (see LU I, 142/ LI I, 93). 
Indeed, Husserl does recognize a ‘material’ sphere of essences (LU II/1, 
252; LI 2, 19), where we can speak, for example, of the essence of a 
house, which is a human artifact and does not easily fit into the picture of 
an eternal realm of ideas. Secondarily, essences must be super-empirical 
in the sense that they cannot be conceived as something wholly 
adventitious, dependent on the peculiarities of factual experiencing. 
However, again, this does not mean that essences are entities foreign to 
the dimension of experience. This last point is a particularly sensitive one, 
since it is directly connected with the issue of idealism in 
phenomenology: according to how the relationship between essences and 
‘sensuous reality’ is understood, Husserlian phenomenology can be 
considered more akin to Fichtean absolute idealism or to Kantian 
transcendental philosophy. 
 
§ 2. Essence and Experience 
 
  Although, with the benefit of hindsight, the accusations of (absolute) 
idealism, which especially followed the publication of the first volume of 
Ideas, can be dispelled as a theoretical misunderstanding, a careful 
reading of both Logical Investigations and Ideas I may make 
comprehensible why such a misunderstanding was possible. When one 
reads the notorious § 49 of Ideas I, where Husserl writes that the being of 
consciousness would not be touched by the annihilation of the world of 
things (Hua III, 115),5 it is difficult not to think that this sounds like an 
unambiguous statement of absolute idealism. Still, one can object that 
many elaborate discussions, especially in the Logical Investigations, 
                                                 
5
 “[W]hile the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, 
would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things 
its own existence would not be touched” (Ideas I, 115/ 110). 
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should be counted as evidence that Husserl was not after a kind of 
idealism of Fichtean brand, where the absolute I creates nature (the non-
I). Indeed, Husserl himself complains in the preface to the second edition 
(1921) of the VI Logical Investigation6 that some misunderstandings 
concerning Ideas I would have been avoided by paying more attention to 
his discussion about sensuous and categorical intuition in the last logical 
investigation.7 But, in fact, the wealth of arguments and reasons in both 
Logical Investigations and Ideas I gives much more the impression of a 
research in progress, with all the due fluctuations, than the idea of an 
established theoretical achievement, and this impression is confirmed by 
some significant self-critical remarks that Husserl produces in later 
works.8 
 According to Husserl essences are a priori, but this does not mean that 
they are ‘innate ideas’: we become aware of essences through a process of 
apprehension that is variously labelled. He speaks in Logical 
Investigations of Ideation, Wesensschau(ung), Ideenschau, and ideierende 
Abstraktion, which can be treated as synonyms, but then he also talks, as 
more specific notions conducive to the apprehension of essences, of 
kategoriale Anschauung, Idealisierung and finally (but thus named only 
in later works) of eidetische Variation. While the first group includes 
aspecific expressions for the process that leads to the apprehension of 
essences, kategoriale Anschauung (categorical intuition), Idealisierung 
(idealization) and eidetische Variation (eidetic variation) point at specific 
aspects of Ideation. 
 The most detailed discussion is devoted to categorical intuition, whose 
analysis, according to Husserl, should remove any doubt concerning the 
appropriate interpretation of the ideal dimension (LU II/2, iv/ LI 2, 179). 
Indeed, absolute idealism does not come out of the pages of the sixth 
Logical Investigation as a plausible option. Already in the Prolegomena 
Husserl was asserting that ideal meanings (ideale Bedeutungen) are 
obtained by a process of abstraction (ideierende Abstraktion) applied to 
singular empirical contents, and that precisely the fact that ideal 
meanings, including logical laws, are so obtained is a warrant of their 
applicability to empirical contents (LU I 101/ LI 1, 69). Abstraction, 
however, must not be understood as a process where part of an empirical 
content is extracted as a part from the whole, because this way of 
interpreting abstraction would not transcend the individual nature of 
empirical contents and could not account for the universal nature of ideas 
(LU II/1, 266-267/ LI 2, 42): the partial extraction of an individual content 
would give us just an impoverished individual content, not a general one. 
The crucial question, with which Husserl struggles, is the classical one of 
                                                 
6
 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. II. Teil II. Elemente einer 
Phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1921). 
Henceforth quoted as: LU II/2. 
7 “Many misunderstandings of my Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology would not 
have been possible had these chapters [Ch. VI in LU II/2] been attended to.” (LI 2, 178; 
LU II/2, iv.) 
8
 Cf. Rinofner-Kreidl, op. cit., 627-630. 
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the common nature that empirical facts and ideas must share in order for 
factual judgments to be conducive to truth and knowledge. The 
Berkeleyan solution, where ideas have the same particular nature of 
sensuous experience is shown by Husserl to be inadequate (LU II/1, 156-
157/ LI 1, 270). But this rejection does not pave the way for any renewed 
version of Platonism either, since the Platonic hypostatization of ideas in 
a separate dimension is explicitly considered unacceptable (Ideas I, 48/ 
41). All in all, the negative features are still much easier to discern than 
the traits of a positive solution.  
 It is clear to Husserl from the beginning that truth cannot be dealt with 
in terms of a direct match between words and things, which would be 
hopelessly heterogeneous. Evidence is fulfillment of intentional acts, but 
the fulfilling element is in turn an (intuitive) act, not a fact or a thing; and 
this makes the poles of the evidence-producing match homogenous. But 
how should we understand, then, the nature of intuitive acts? Perception, 
but also imagination and recollection are said to be intuitive acts, but 
perception appears to have priority. According to Husserl, categorical 
intuition is based on sensuous intuition, that is, on properly understood 
perception. Sensuous intuition is concerned with individual real contents 
and brings to light objects and states of affairs, which are expressed by 
perceptual judgments, on which sensuous concepts (e.g., ‘house’) and 
pure categorical concepts (e.g., ‘relation’) are founded (fundiert) (LU II/2, 
184/ LI 2, 307). Every categorical (abstract) concept is said to presuppose 
sensuous intuition (LU II/2, 183/ LI 2, 307), even if categorical universal 
notions are apprehended only by means of reflective (founded) acts (LU 
II/2, 146/ LI 2, 282): this is the core of the process of ideation. 
 It is important to notice that the ideal dimension that thence emerges is 
not a full-fledged set of ‘exact’ laws and concepts. What is apprehended 
by direct ‘ideation’ belongs rather to a sphere of ‘inexact essences’, 
whereas exact essences, like geometrical conceptuality, can be obtained 
only through a process of peculiar idealization (Idealisierung) (LU II/1, 
245/ LI 2, 15).9 Actually, all the laws of exact sciences are said to be the 
outcome of idealizing fictions (idealisierende Fiktionen) (LU I 72/LI 1, 
52). This distinction between exact and inexact essences finds an 
alternative expression in later texts in terms of free and bound idealities 
(freie und gebundene Idealitäten)10. Still, in the light of the famous 
analysis that Husserl devoted to the origins of geometry in the Crisis, it is 
appropriate to emphasize that tracing the purest samples of the ideal 
dimension (e.g., geometrical laws) back to an idealizing process rooted in 
perceptual givenness does not represent at all a repudiation of the non-
empirical nature of essences. No doubt, the emphasis changes from the 
                                                 
9
 “The essences which direct ideation elicits from intuitive data are ‘inexact essences’, 
they may not be confused with the ‘exact’ essences which are ideas in the Kantian sense, 
and which (like ‘ideal point’, an ideal surface or solid, or ideal species of colour in the 
ideal colour-pyramid) arise through a peculiar ‚idealization’” (LI 2, 15/245). 
10
 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. Churchill & 
Ameriks (Northwestern University Press, 1973), 267. Hereafter cited as EJ. - Erfahrung 
und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, edited by Ludwig Landgrebe 
(Prag: Academia Verlag, 1939), 321. 
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early pages where Husserl writes that sensuous images are the 
presupposition for geometrical idealization, but just as aids to intellection 
(Verständnishilfen) (LU II/1, 65/LI 1, 208), to the late pages where 
Husserl recognizes the essential role of writing, drawing and field 
measurements for the very birth of geometry.11 Still, Husserl underlines 
the non-empirical status of essences in the very pages where he 
recognizes perceptual experience as founding act for categorical intuition 
and acknowledges the need of a peculiar process of idealization to grasp 
free exact idealities. It seems that, what Husserl means is that essences do 
have intrinsic boundaries, but that such boundaries are not intrinsically 
‘exact’, although they can be made exact through an idealizing process. 
And indeed, if we tentatively conceive of the essential boundaries as a 
kind of differentia specifica that defines conceptual areas, we should hold 
firm that the boundary between concepts cannot be but a further concept 
(not a ‘line’), which has a general character in its turn. This means that the 
exactness of the ideal meanings of mathematics and logical laws, far from 
being the natural condition of essential meanings, can take shape only 
through an explicit definitional effort. Still, with regard to the nature of 
essences, the importance of the fact that such exact boundaries can be 
drawn must not be underestimated. 
 The claim that essences have a super-empirical status has a specific 
polemical target, which is the influential understanding of experience 
inherited from classical empiricism. Essences are non-empirical in the 
sense of empiricism; that is: perception cannot be understood as a causal 
process where individual facts in the external world produce impressions 
on the five senses, which in their turn would be just individual parts of an 
individual body. Although there is no doubt that we can provide 
descriptions of sensuous phenomena, inclusive of biological bodies, in 
terms of individual facts, this kind of description is necessarily inadequate 
to account for truth and knowledge in general: no knowledge can be 
sensibly said to emerge from the encounter of mere individual facts, since 
by definition individual facts are non-repeatable instances, which cannot 
account for object recognition, recollection, comparison, etc. By granting 
this conclusion we posit the very existence of epistemic facts as ground 
for a basic ontological conclusion: in order for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) (or 
at least its appearance) to be, there must be something more than mere 
individuals and therefore something like essences is required. In 
connection with this, it should be noted that to reach this conclusion it is 
not necessary to grant that knowledge be ever fully accomplished; indeed, 
we do not even need to admit that knowledge is ‘actual’ at all: the very 
fact that in the world there is something that claims to have knowledge 
implies that individual factuality is an ontological dimension insufficient 
to account for (the whole of) being. This recognition of the inadequacy of 
any conceptualization of being in terms of individuality (factuality, 
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 Edmund Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 
trans. D. Carr (Northwestern University Press, 1970), 24-27. Herafter cited as Crisis. - 
Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, 
W. Biemel (ed.), (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), 22-25. 
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causality) lies at the core of the two fundamental characterizations of 
phenomenology, as transcendental and eidetic science.12 The epoché 
comes to light as a methodical procedure aimed at purifying knowledge 
from all the spurious solutions apparently offered by the reference to the 
dimension of individual factuality. In this sense the transcendental 
direction of Husserl’s thought, which develops after the publication of 
Logical Investigations, depends on the recognition that there are essences. 
Under the epoché the question of the ontological status of phenomena is 
suspended, because the ‘what’ can eventually emerge only from the ‘how’ 
of what is given to consciousness. Reality (Realität), which is the set of 
all spatiotemporal determinations, cannot be posited at the beginning of a 
philosophical analysis, because such a set is precisely the realm of 
unrepeatable individuality, which cannot ground any knowledge. Still, as 
we will see, the very fact that the inaugural gesture of phenomenological 
investigation is the separation of individual reality from the estates of 
truth and knowledge implies that this dimension remains decisive for any 
determination of the full meaning of phenomenological results. The 
question of the ontological status of phenomena, and then of essences, 
cannot and must not be considered at the start of phenomenological 
investigations, but no phenomenological investigation is fully 
accomplished until that question is tackled as well. 
 Husserl extensively deals with the question of what appears to 
consciousness as existing beyond consciousness, and he names it 
transcendence. This discussion takes place especially, as is to be 
expected, in the context of his analyses of perception. Perception, we said, 
is founding for categorical intuition even if in perception there is a 
constitutive reference to individuality. Already in the immediate sphere of 
perceptual apprehension objects and states of affairs are given so that they 
can be recognized, compared, regarded as similar or dissimilar, 
recollected, etc. This means that, although only the founded acts of 
reflection bring to light categories proper, already at the perceptual level 
the synthesis of identification takes place, which leads to the 
apprehension of essences (LU II/2, 51, 149-150/ LI 2, 217, 284-285). 
When we perceive an object, we can direct our attention towards its 
individual irreducible determinations or towards its identity, which is 
preserved regardless of how many specifications we can explicate. It must 
be noticed that, strictly speaking, individuals are never given to 
consciousness as objects, since objects are by definition iterable, while 
individuals as such are unique. As has been noticed,13 it seems awkward 
to claim, as Husserl does, that we can grasp objective essences by 
experiencing sensuous individuals; however this is no mystery if we 
correctly understand the nature of perceptual individuality. Perception is a 
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 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. D. 
Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993, 71). Hereafter cited as CM. - Cartesianische 
Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, Husserliana I, S. Strasser (ed.), (Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 106. 
13
 J.N. Mohanty, “Individual Fact and Essence in Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy,” in 
Phenomenology and Ontology, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 152-162. 
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process in which individuality is signaled precisely by the developing 
horizon of possible specifications of the object, while each specification 
that we grasp already represents an identifiable object. What is properly 
individual is only that which cannot appear as self-identical more than 
once, and this means that at the level of perceptual experience the 
individual is manifest through the dimension of sensuous transcendence 
(Ur-Affektionen, Ur-Impressionen). Individuals are ‘objects’ before being 
apprehended as objects, they are unfolding affections that call for being 
objectified. From this point of view we can see that the traditional notion 
of individuality appears phenomenologically as a metaphysical fiction, 
since individual is properly never an object, but only the transcendent 
‘source’ of emerging objectifications. Whatever I gather and acquire from 
sensuous intuition is always already an entity endowed with identity, even 
if I am unable to name such identity and even if I am completely unable to 
point out its boundaries. When we constitute spatial and temporal 
orderings, we can often characterize individuality by reference to 
spatiotemporal identification; this however, is not the original way in 
which individuality proper is given to us. (Indeed, we can say that a 
spatiotemporal determination is individual only after introducing the idea 
of objective time, where each position in time is absolutely unique.) 
 Still, even if we grant that this is the background of sensuous intuition 
where recognizable units first come to light, we must wait for reflective 
acts in order to properly identify such units. The procedure by which we 
can try to isolate the boundaries of essences is called by Husserl 
eidetische Variation: we vary in imagination the features of a represented 
object in order to explore the extent to which we are still prone to 
acknowledge the fantasized variations as traits of the same object; when 
we no longer think that the varied object is the same, from a certain point 
of view, we have reached an essential boundary. This procedure extracts 
from the object, as it was immediately apprehended, its essential features 
and allows us to obtain a categorical grasp of its essence. However, this 
procedure may seem dubious, since it depends integrally on a previously 
synthesized identity, which we have chosen to submit to eidetic variation. 
Thus, one could wonder if the eidetic variation is not merely bound to 
discover as what is essential in its object that which already was decided 
as belonging to the chosen object: what we recognize as ‘the same object’ 
would have to be rejected on the basis of our cultural and linguistic 
biases. In other terms: if we want to single out the essence of ‘tree’, are 
not we bound just to discover what our ‘conventionally’ shared 
understanding of ‘tree’ is like? In order to see the authentic scope of 
eidetic variation, we must realize that the task of such a methodical 
procedure is to be kept strictly apart from the classical task of reaching 
the true definition of a substance by genus proximum and differentia 
specifica. In order to recognize the subsistence of essential features, we 
need not be able to univocally determine what the ‘only true’ essence of a 
commonly named entity is. Cultural differences may well make us doubt 
what the most authentic definition of ‘humankind’ or ‘house’ is, but this 
sort of possible disagreement concerns just the most preferred label that 
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we are ready to assign: we may disagree whether ‘mankind’ is better 
identified by the ability to talk, the capacity to shape tools, the virtues of 
self-consciousness, etc. Eidetic variation does not aim at establishing 
which differentia specifica is the ‘true’ one, but it aims at discovering all 
the essential phenomenal thresholds. In the end we may well conclude 
that there is more than one appropriate definition of ‘humankind’, but this 
does not touch the ability of eidetic variation to discover the ‘conceptual 
discontinuities’ that are essential to the considered object. Even if the 
starting point of eidetic variation is a real entity, a sensuous individual, 
the features that take shape as essential are purified from all individual 
accidentality. One might object that the thus-found ‘essential’ thresholds 
merely mirror our interests: for instance, we consider ‘rationality’ more 
interesting as a threshold determining humanity than being a ‘featherless 
biped’. This is true, but it is no objection from a Husserlian perspective, 
insofar as we realize that ‘interested intentionality’ (motivation) need not 
be conceived as something arbitrary or accidental. 
 Although perception has a functional priority in the apprehension of 
essences, what counts in perception is not the reality (spatiotemporal 
actuality) of perceptual acts, but its ‘unreal’ component, which is also the 
one that we can grasp ‘virtually’ in the form of free imaginary variation. 
And indeed, Husserl observes that we could not have categorical intuition 
without the possibility to have the same ‘content’ in the same way also 
through imagination14 15. Both the notions of perception and imagination 
undergo an extension of meaning in the Logical Investigations: in 
imagination we find, next to a merely virtual modality, a thetic (setzend) 
modus, which posits the imagined content as being; and in perception we 
find, next to a narrowly sensuous acceptation of perceiving, a wider 
dimension, which involves an imaginational component and allows 
categorical intuition. It is precisely because perception involves an 
‘imaginational’ component that essences can be said to be directly 
perceived. In fact, the very expression ‘seeing of essences’ (Wesensschau) 
has been often criticized because of its Platonic flavor, which in the light 
of the later developments of Husserl’s thought, appears as a misleading 
trait.16 However, whatever the terminological preferences, something is 
clear in LU and remains true down to the latest developments: there must 
be essences, and they must be staged already at the immediate level of 
perception. Imagination, in the procedure of eidetic variation, is 
conducive to the isolation of essences since ‘imagination’ of a sort is 
always already involved in the acts of sensuous perception. In this sense, 
the vindication of the founding role of sensuous intuition for categorical 
intuition is enough to reject any suspicion of Platonic dualism, but is not 
                                                 
14
 “It is clear, in any case, that the concept of imagination must be widened in 
correspondence with the concept of perception. We could not speak of something super-
sensuously or categorially perceived, if we could not imagine this thing‚ in the same 
manner’ (i.e., not merely sensuously)” (LI 2, 281/144). 
15
 Cf. R. Sowa, “Wesen und Wesensgesetze in der deskriptiven Eidetik Edmund 
Husserls,” in Phenomenologische Forschungen, 2007, 5-37, here 22 et seq. 
16
 Sowa, op. cit., 6. 
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enough to dispel all suspicions of absolute idealism. After all, the 
fundamental role played by (productive) imagination in Fichte’s idealism 
is well-known and crucial. The fact that sensuous experience is required 
for categorical intuition does not exclude in principle that perception 
could be actively ‘manipulated’ by something like the Fichtean version of 
productive imagination. In the end, the fundamental role of imagination 
seems to be confirmed by Husserl’s remarks like the one where he writes 
that the realm of possible experiences necessarily includes the realm of 
actual experiences as a subset, at least regarding their essence (Ideas I, 
349-350/ 341-342); this seems to imply that nothing that we could 
sensuously experience could ever trespass the boundaries of what is in 
principle imaginable. This may seem to imply that nothing essential could 
be ever learned from experience, since the a priori realm of the 
imaginable is fully self-sufficient with respect to the dimension of 
meanings. 
 At this stage, the ontological status of essences is still doubtful; yet, 
what we can take as established is that the ideal dimension can be said to 
be super-empirical from three points of view: 1) because it is irreducible 
to individual transcendent reality; 2) because it represents the permanence 
of self-identical items across the flow of ever-changing experiences, and 
3) because it can be isolated with the contribution of purely fictitious 
procedures (eidetic variation, but also the idealizing fictions conducive to 
‘exact’ essences). Nevertheless, the ideal dimension is rooted in 
perceptual experience. To put order in this question we have now to 
investigate the non-temporal character of essences, which requires a 
clarification of the relationship between experience and temporality. 
 
§ 3. Essences and Time-consciousness 
 
 Objectivity means general validity in different times and for different 
subjects; in this sense objectivity characterizes the sphere of essences.17 In 
the same years in which Husserl extensively dwells on the issue of 
ideality, he also intensively deals with the question of time-consciousness, 
where the problem of the emergence of objectivity looms large. Since the 
objectivity of something implies that it remains the same while individual 
determinations change, it is plain that there is a constitutive connection 
between time-consciousness and the nature of objectivity (ideality). 
Husserl’s analyses of time-consciousness are vast and complex, but a 
selective view guided by our focus on the question of essence should 
allow us to provide a compact account of the points of our concern. In 
light of the above mentioned order of foundation between sensuous and 
categorical intuition, we can start the analysis of time-consciousness from 
the constitution of perceptual units. The inadequacy of the notion of 
individuality in accounting for knowledge is manifest if we consider that 
                                                 
17
 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(1893-1917), trans. J.B. Brough (Dordrecht, Springer, 2008), 10. Hereafter cited as CIT. 
- Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), edited by 
Rudolf Böhm, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 9-10. See also LU II/1, 8. 
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its experiential counterpart, which is an individual sensuous ‘now’, does 
not provide a sufficient basis for the apprehension of perceptual objects. 
If, with Husserl, we call sensation (Empfindung) an individual sensuous 
affection, we must admit that the apprehension of perceptual objects 
requires a diachronic synthesis, which goes beyond any individual present 
manifestation (CIT, 7-8/8). In Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner 
Time Consciousness sensations are said to be data immanent in 
consciousness, whereas perceptual objects are said to be transcendent, 
which means that they appear as something that is never fully reducible to 
the experiences thereof (CIT, 6/6). A full perceptual presentation of the 
object turns out to be an impossible task, since only perspectival parts can 
be given to us in sensuous evidence;18 that is why Husserl says that we 
perceive objects always only by adumbrations (Abschattungen). This 
manifest impossibility suggests that any interpretation of the 
apprehension of perceptual objects that wanted to rely only on individual 
sensuous data is misplaced. Indeed, Husserl’s analysis shows that the 
perceptual present is no instantaneous ‘sense datum’, since it always 
displays a train of retained impressions, which is what allows our 
apprehension of perceptual objects to take place. We can recognize a 
current melody, even if we have each time in sensuous presence only a 
single note; analogously, we can recognize a present visual object, even if 
we can never have the sensuous evidence of all its parts from all its 
possible perspectives. The modifications of consciousness that track the 
just elapsed sensuous changes are called retentions, while protentions are 
the immediate ‘expectations’ concerning the next course of sensuous 
changes. Neither retentions nor protentions are present in the same sense 
in which actual sensuous impressions are present, however, as they are 
essential components of the perceptual present and no perception in act 
could take place without their aid. The condition for our recognition of 
the heard melody is not that the previously played notes are 
‘simultaneously’ present together in a synoptic representation, because 
this would not account precisely for their being articulated in an order of 
succession: the previously heard notes must be ‘latently efficacious’ on 
the notes that are each time sensuously present, and in order to do so, they 
must preserve their relative positions in the unfolding of the melody. 
 It is important to note that this point cannot be treated as a mere 
psychological consideration, as if it concerned psychological abilities in 
time detection, to be dealt with in the mental sphere, while ‘time in itself’ 
would be available somewhere else regardless of subjective apprehension. 
The fundamental character of the analyses on time-consciousness consists 
in their presupposition for any further analysis of empirical or scientific 
nature. The point is that there is no way to derive from a set of available 
events their order of succession, unless there is retentional consciousness 
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 Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis: Lectures on 
Transcendental Logic, trans. A.J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Springer, 2001), 42. Hereafter 
cited as APS - Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und 
Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926, Husserliana XI, edited by Margot Fleischer (Den 
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 3. 
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of their mutual relations. Whenever we start our analysis from a set of 
allegedly individual events, for instance mental events in an actual brain 
or material events in an instant of the universe, we miss the conceptual 
resources to draw from them temporal connections (among which are 
causal ones). Our only source of orders of succession is time-
consciousness, which defeats the vision of being as individual present 
being, by showing how anything we apprehend, starting with perceptual 
objects, can subsist only in an originally temporal dimension where the 
presence of the individual appears only as part of a (latently efficacious) 
flow. At the level of time-consciousness epistemic and ontological traits 
cannot be disjoined. 
 This conclusion may seem to pull Husserl’s account of the ontological 
status of essences again in the direction of absolute idealism. Indeed, the 
above mentioned idea that perception has a constitutive imaginational 
component has a counterpart in the analyses of time-consciousness, when, 
in the wake of Brentano’s work, Husserl attributes to fantasy (Phantasie) 
a productive role as connective tissue of temporal representations (CIT, 
11/12).19 Later on, Husserl will prefer to talk of such a connective 
function initially labeled as fantasy in terms of retentions and protentions, 
but the point remains the same: duration and succession come to being 
only with the active contribution of consciousness. However, in the very 
analyses of time-consciousness we find also the best reasons not to 
interpret the indispensable role of consciousness in terms of Fichtean 
productive imagination. Indeed, we see that the constitution of percepts 
requires reference to a transcendent dimension both as a starting point 
and as a target. Retention retains (and ‘modifies’) something, which is no 
perceptual object yet, but is not nothing either. This means first that, in 
the founding acts, ‘fantasy’ or, if we like, ‘productive imagination’ is 
constitutively operating on something that goes beyond itself (something 
transcendent): this is transcendence as the point of departure for the 
cognitive process. Secondarily, when a perceptual object is finally 
apprehended, it is recognized as transcendent because it is always more 
than the sum of the retained experiences: this is transcendence as target of 
the cognitive process. The relevant implications can be expressed from 
two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, we are not entitled to 
say that our perceptual activity ‘reconstructs’ the object as it is in itself, 
because we are never in a position to state what something, regardless of 
its encounter with consciousness, is. This is especially significant with 
regard to orders of succession and therefore to temporality as such. On the 
other hand, we are not even entitled to conceive of impressional or 
objectual transcendence as something produced by subjectivity and 
dependent on it. If we are faithful to the phenomenological principle of 
acknowledging only what is presented within the limits in which it is 
presented (Ideas I, 52/44), we have to admit that transcendence signals an 
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 “Phantasy thus proves to be productive in a peculiar way here. This ist he sole instance 
in which phantasy creates a truly new moment of representation, namely, the temporal 
moment. We have therefore discovered the origin of the representation of time in the 
region of phantasy.” (CIT, 11/12.) 
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original passivity that can be never legitimately posited as a creation by 
subjectivity. Nothing in phenomena can justify an interpretation of 
transcendence in terms of a kind of Fichtean Nicht-Ich, unconsciously 
produced by the subject. Even if the thesis of absolute idealism, strictly 
speaking, can be never refuted by phenomena, it is decisive to realize that 
it is never motivated by phenomena: what we experience bears witness to 
an original dimension of passivity, which we have no reason to discard in 
favor of an hypothetical antecedent unconscious activity. Yet, it is 
important to observe that the question that Fichte raised while criticizing 
the Kantian notion of ‘Thing-in-itself’ remains alive for Husserl. 
Methodologically Husserl teaches us to produce fundamental analyses 
under epoché, and therefore to suspend all questions concerning reality 
and causality of beings in themselves. However, it would be a 
misunderstanding to conclude that phenomenology is not concerned with 
ontology. Although it is improper to enroll Husserl in the ranks of 
traditionally understood idealism or realism, the issue of ‘real’ being is 
absolutely essential in his thought. Indeed, one should not be deceived by 
the treatment of ‘reality’ in terms of spatiotemporal Realität versus the 
dimension of immanent experiences (reell), since the point to look at in 
order to grasp the roots of the ontological question in Husserl is rather the 
notion of transcendence (which is a more comprehensive notion than both 
the reell and real spheres). 
 
§ 4. Essence and Transcendence 
 
 In Husserlian terms, the transcendent is what is given to consciousness 
as irreducible to consciousness, which means that transcendence signals a 
subsistence that is beyond the powers of subjectivity, while not being 
wholly foreign to subjectivity. Across Husserl’s texts few phenomenal 
areas are explicitly named as full-fledged embodiments of the 
transcendent dimension: we will mention and briefly illustrate four such 
embodiments. 
 1) The first and most elementary instance of transcendence concerns the 
primal dimension of passivity in perception. Primal impressions (Ur-
impressionen), sensuous reliefs (Abhebungen), affections (Affektionen) 
are all expressions that signal the primal level of sensuous experience, 
whose original passivity points at an original ‘anonymous substrate’. This 
is the sphere that at first Husserl terms hylé. This term, however, involved 
sensations interpreted as ‘raw matter’ of intentionality, and sensations are 
still immanent data.20 Therefore, Husserl did successively introduce and 
consistently use the term Ur-hylé, whenever he wanted to emphasize the 
‘pre-cognitive’ transcendent character of the substrate of all sensuous 
experience. 
 2) Secondly, Husserl repeatedly asserts the transcendent nature of 
material objects. While the notion of object (Gegenstand) is primarily 
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 See L. R. Rabanaque, “Hyle, Genesis and Noema,” in Husserl Studies 19 (2003): 205–
215, here 207-8; cf. Lotz, From Affectivity to Subjectivity. Husserl’s Phenomenology 
Revisited (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 86-7. 
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used by Husserl to name the intentional object in general, that is, the 
correlate of consciousness a parte objecti, Husserl speaks of things 
(Dinge) or real (real) objects when he wants to refer to transcendent 
‘material’ objects. The transcendent object is what is adumbrated by 
adumbrations (das Abgeschattete): whereas adumbrations are immanent 
sensuous data, their ever-elusive but constitutively intended reference is 
the real object as transcendent unit. Transcendent is now not just the 
shapeless pre-cognitive ‘row matter’ of perception (hylé), but also the 
shaped unit that we intend as independently existent. In fact, real things as 
such are qualified by cognitive attributions, since they are, at least, 
recognized as existent in space, and the attribution of spatial predicates 
can take place only in the wake of sentient spontaneous bodily 
movements (Kinästhesen), which originarily articulate space with 
reference to the orientation of our living body (Leib).21 In Ideas II Husserl 
shows that real things are constituted as unitary schemas or rules of 
change proper to possible manifestations (Regel möglicher 
Erscheinungen):22 such schemas are characterized by the fact that the 
parts of the thing belong together (according to a ‘rule’) when they are 
involved in common causal circumstances (Ideas II, 42-43/45-46). 
Husserl, however, clearly distinguishes two phenomenal dimensions in 
the constitution of the thing: on the one hand, there is the schema, which 
is the manifestation (Bekundung) of the identity of the thing; on the other, 
there is sensuous transcendence, which provides the original 
manifestation (Beurkundung) of the ‘substantial reality’ of the thing 
(Ideen II, 131/139). This distinction shows that the unity and identity of 
the thing, which appears through its ‘adumbrations’, relies, as to its 
‘substantial reality’, on the reference to an aperspectival transcendent 
core. Such a transcendent core is precisely the same elementary instance 
of transcendence that we have previously mentioned (1). This does not 
mean that our experience of an actual thing separately displays these two 
constitutive levels: towards the spatial thing we are receptive in a more 
specific sense than we are towards mere sensuous transcendence, since 
we are perceptive of a spatial thing, which can be never fully given in 
sensuous presence, but is always apperceived on the basis of retained 
kinaesthetic experiences. In this sense the transcendent thing is 
transcendent as thing, that is, as something endowed with unity and 
identity while its sensuous adumbrations change. 
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 Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, trans. Rojcewicz (Dordrecht, 
Springer, 2010), 131 et seq. Hereafter cited as DR. - Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907, 
Husserliana XVI, edited by Ulrich Claesges (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 154 et 
seq.. 
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 Edmund Husserl, [Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and 
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(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). Hereafter cited as Ideas II.; Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. 
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1952), 86. 
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 Against what has been often said, for example and authoritatively by 
Roman Ingarden,23 the way in which transcendence is attributed to spatial 
objects does not conceal either a dualistic or an idealistic thesis (in the 
classical sense).24 The fact that spatial determinations require the 
intervention of embodied consciousness in the form of kinaestheses does 
not make spatial determinations into something arbitrarily created by 
consciousness, because kinaestheses always deal with an irreducible 
alterity, which is passively given. True enough, such an irreducibly 
alterity is not to be conceived as a Kantian ‘Ding-an-sich’, wholly foreign 
to consciousness; but this does not oblige Husserl’s account to fall into 
the Fichtean alternative. As we will see better later on, the fact that we are 
affected by sensuous transcendence and are ‘called to respond’ through 
kinaesthetic ‘explorations’ manifests an essential affinity between 
consciousness and what transcends consciousness: that is why Husserl 
claims in the Cartesian Meditations that being and consciousness ‘belong 
together’ (CM, 117/84).25 
 3) A third sphere of phenomena that Husserl considers exemplary of 
transcendence is the experience of the Others as Alter Egos. Although 
Alter Egos can be apprehended only through their bodily manifestations 
and therefore require the ability to apprehend transcendent objects in 
order to be properly perceived, they represent also a peculiar instance of 
transcendence, irreducible to the nature of things. Alter Egos are not 
experienced just as objects, but also as bearers of intentional experiences, 
i.e., as subjects. What is specifically transcendent in Alter Egos is not just 
the unitary completion of definite bodies, but also above all the 
spontaneous sphere of intentionality, which finds manifold perceptual 
manifestations that constitutively exceeds all its manifestations. When we 
perceive somebody as an Alter Ego, we perceive it as a perceiver, and the 
nature of intentional acts is never reducible to objectual manifestations. 
Even if Husserl occasionally mentions the perception of the Other 
(Fremdwahrnehmung) as the source of all transcendence,26 he generally 
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 Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism (Den 
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recognizes and argues that we must encounter the otherness of the Others 
on the basis of our ‘primordial’ intentionality, which is the core of 
intentional consciousness before intersubjectivity comes on stage.27 This 
means, among other things, that we can perceive Alter Egos only in the 
wake of our ability to apprehend material objects. Not everything is 
straightforward in this consideration, however, because Husserl’s analysis 
also shows that objectivity can be grasped only with reference to an ideal 
(transcendental) intersubjectivity: whenever we judge that something has 
objective existence, we implicitly assume that it is something subsistent 
for any possible subjects. This seems to produce a paradox: we must be 
able to grasp objects in order to perceive other subjects, yet, we must 
already have cognizance of intersubjectivity in order to grasp objects. 
This issue, when it is treated in the framework of genetic phenomenology, 
as it is the case in the Cartesian Meditations, turns out to be a rather 
thorny one, and we cannot hope here either to follow Husserl’s discussion 
or to offer a fully satisfactory interpretation of it. However a couple of 
observations are in order and should allow us to profitably progress in our 
analysis.  
 When we, as single subjects in the primordial sphere (i.e., abstracting 
from anything of intersubjective origin), perceive an objectual entity (a 
thing), we apprehend something that can be said to be ‘akin to’ an 
objective entity, while not being properly objective yet. When we 
perceive a material thing, we grasp something as permanent across a 
succession of impermanent impressions (adumbrations). The fact that, 
regardless of verbal categorization, we can recognize the same object or 
similar ones in successive moments shows that we have memory of that 
perceptual unit. This step can be regarded as the primal passive moment 
in the process of ideation, leading from sensuous to categorical intuition. 
But Husserl repeatedly argued also that the fact that we have memory of a 
perceived object implies that the object is potentially available for a 
plurality of subjects, insofar as it is available for my very self over time 
(Crisis, 188-189/184-185; Hua XV, 332-333). This consideration seems 
to open the way towards an apprehension of intersubjectivity and 
objectivity already in the primordial dimension.28 However, this is no 
full-fledged objectivity yet, but is rather its primordial presupposition: we 
have to do with an object endowed with lasting identity, but it is an 
‘inexact’ identity, which cannot raise claims of validity for ever and 
everybody. The ability to apprehend objects at the primordial level of 
perception seems to be a presupposition for the intuition of 
intersubjectivity in three distinct senses. First, because we could not 
perceive Others if we were unable to perceive their bodies as objectual 
units; second, because the stable apprehension of percepts in memory is 
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the basic presupposition for any intersubjective agreement or 
disagreement; finally, because the primordial ability to grasp objects 
endowed with identity motivates the pursuit of intersubjective validity 
(objectivity), when the recognition of Alter Egos takes place: since we 
naturally obtain stable beliefs on what there is, we do not want them to be 
shaken by Others (when we recognize them as bearers of claims and 
beliefs in turn), and this means that we must go for an upgrade of our 
primordial beliefs in the direction of intersubjective validity. All that said, 
the sphere of intersubjectivity can be fully accessed only in the wake of a 
specific Fremderfahrung, which manifests also the irreducible kind of 
transcendence pertaining to other subjects. 
 4) The last ‘sphere of phenomena’ to which Husserl explicitly and 
eminently attributes transcendence is, somewhat surprisingly, the very 
sphere of essences. Essences are said to be transcendent because they are 
not an actual part of our mental contents (cogitationes);29 30 and indeed 
we intentionally address essences precisely as transcendent entities (Ideas 
I, 85/78), that is, we discover them and do not have them in our power. At 
first, the transcendent character of essences may seem surprising, if we 
focus on sensuous transcendence as a model, because essences are said to 
be something that we cognitively grasp, while transcendence seems to 
signal something that constitutively escapes our grasp. But, in fact, we 
must pay attention both to the specific way in which essences are 
‘grasped’ and to the way in which transcendence ‘escapes our grasp’. To 
begin with, we must resist the temptation to think of the transcendence of 
essences in Platonic terms, in the wake of the classical examples 
concerning logical and mathematical truths. Mathematical truths are a 
valid exemplification of the transcendence of essences, but may turn out 
to be a misleading one, because it could make it seem that thus-
understood essences are to be catalogued next to Ur-hylé, material things 
and Alter Egos, in a rather heterogeneous list of transcendent spheres. On 
the contrary, it is important to note that essences are not to be treated on 
the same plane as the previously mentioned spheres, since clearly Ur-
hylé, material things and Alter Egos all have essences in their turn. In 
which sense, then, are essences transcendent, granted that they are 
cognitively graspable? 
 Let us put some order in the characterization of essences so far. In one 
account, Husserlian essences must be taken to refer to an indefinitely vast 
set of entities, since literally anything that can be conceptualized, 
preserving identity while its experiential props change, has an essence. 
From this perspective the interpretive option that sees essences as mere 
abstractions from plural accidental experiences could seem compelling, 
insofar as the alternative seems to be the assumption of infinite 
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universalia ante rem referring, for example, to each conceivable artifact. 
From this point of view Husserl’s realm of essences could seem either 
implausibly overcrowded or threatened by accidentality. In the first case, 
we would be required to imagine a realm of essences where all 
conceivable objects (included artifacts) are ab aeterno heralded. In the 
second, we should conceive of essences as outcomes of a selective 
abstraction from individual experiences. Thus, we are apparently pulled in 
two directions, both unpalatable and both denied by Husserl: on the one 
hand, we are prompted to assume that our experiences are guided by 
essences understood as separate pre-existent ideas of the objects to be 
grasped; on the other, we are prompted to abandon the a priori nature of 
essences and fall back on psychologism (psychological abstraction). 
Granted that Husserl rejects both options, we must ask whether in the 
available conceptual framework there is a third option, compatible with 
Husserl’s account. 
 We can begin to approximate a solution by examining the constitutive 
relation connecting the nature of essences with the sensuous dimension of 
transcendence, which we have found at the roots of Ur-hylé, material 
things and Alter Egos. In Husserlian terms, the issue of transcendence is 
coextensive with the traditional issue of ontology: transcendence names 
the problem of what subsists beyond the powers of consciousness (while 
being given to consciousness). In this sense, transcendence must be 
‘grasped’ by consciousness, but as something signaling an irreducible 
‘excess of content’ against what is, each time, immanently present. From 
this perspective a family resemblance between transcendence and essence 
becomes evident: essences are posited as being, but at the same time they 
are always presumptive as to their embodiment. When we realize through 
visual perception that something is a tree, we grasp an objectual essence 
in the wake of a train of sensuous experiences. More precisely: regardless 
of any contingent definition of ‘tree’, the point of our pre-verbal grasp of 
the essence of the visual tree is that we can immediately follow its 
resemblances and differences, that we can recognize it and recall it over 
time. This is no full-fledged ideation, no clear-cut grasp of the essence 
tree, but rather its pre-reflective basis. 
 Now, the grasp of the essence of the tree through perceptual acts 
implies that we posit the percept as being, but also that our actual 
sensations are never an exhaustive warrant that the grasped essence is 
really (corporeally) there. Thus, we must draw the following partial 
conclusion: essences, when they are primarily intuited, are something like 
constitutive postulates concerning transcendence. Transcendence and 
essence are, in a sense, different emphases on the same: transcendence 
signals that something subsists beyond the powers of consciousness, while 
essence signals that beyond the powers of consciousness something 
subsists. Essences are what transform the ‘enigma’ of transcendence into 
ontological claims. One could object that essences, interpreted in these 
terms, could be regarded as mere hypotheses or fantasies produced to 
account for sensations; but such an interpretation would make the mistake 
of psychologizing cognition. By psychologizing cognition we would 
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interpret it in terms of individual facts present to the factual mind (brain), 
which is untenable. Husserl’s point is rather that, on the one hand, we do 
not have the latent parts of the perceptual object imaginatively co-present 
with the sensuously given parts; on the other, there is nothing in the 
sensuously given parts that compels us to conclude that we are in front of 
a unitary thing (DR 56-57/46-47). This means that any possible talk of 
hypothetical or imaginative ‘complements’ of perception must anyway 
make reference to an ‘ontological thesis’, a constitutive claim that posits 
the substantial nature of what is sensuously given across changing 
experiences. Essence is a name for such a constitutive ontological claim. 
 
§ 5. The A Priori Nature of Essences 
 
 If this perspective makes sense, some specifications of our general 
understanding of the notion of essence must ensue. Whenever we identify 
an essence through full-fledged ideation (with eidetic variation) we can 
discern a meaning-determining component and a being-bestowing 
component. This is compatible with the schema content-apprehension 
(Inhalt-Auffassung) that Husserl argues for in the Logical Investigations; 
however that schema is not really enlightening with regard to the 
ontological status of essence. Essence is primarily intuited in categorical 
intuition when the meaning-determining component 
(Bedeutungsintention) is fulfilled by fulfilling acts (erfüllende Akte): this 
is what happens, for instance, when we first perceive a tree as a tree. As 
Husserl writes, the essence relevant for knowledge (erkenntnismäßiges 
Wesen) in objectifying acts is given by the synthesis provided by the 
fulfillment of the meaning act (which is articulated in two components: 
Qualität and Materie) (LU II/2, 96-7/LI 2, 245-246). With regard to the 
essence of ‘tree’, this (approximately) means that we grasp it when we are 
‘disposed’ to perceive a tree and when the train of sensations (among 
which are kinaesthetic ones) that is actually given to us can be considered 
fulfilling the ‘disposition’. Once we have obtained the categorical 
intuition of the essence ‘tree’, we can refine it into a definition or maybe 
formalize its notion for semantic purposes, but these developments are 
extrinsic to the intuition of the essence. 
 Now we have to ask: what is a priori in the thus-grasped essence of 
‘tree’ and in what sense is it a priori? As we are going to see, there is a 
plurality of senses in which we can talk of the a priori dimension with 
regard to the intuition of essences. To begin with, in a sense, we might 
say that both the signitive intention that looks for intuitive fulfillment and 
the relevant fulfilling entity are ‘a priori’. The signitive intention is a 
priori only in the sense that it is given before the intuitive experience 
(e.g., of an empirical tree), so that it can lead to the intuition of ‘tree’. In 
the light of the developments following Ideas I, the notion of horizon 
(Horizont), on which we will dwell next, becomes the protagonist of this 
pre-intuitive moment: horizons (like signitive intentions) pre-delineate 
experience. In this sense, the relevant signitive intention is only prior to 
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its fulfilling experience, but is not prior to experience as such, since the 
‘horizonal intentionality’ is also shaped by previous experience. 
 On the other hand, the fulfilling entity that we will eventually identify 
as tree, is a priori only in the sense that it is experienced as subsistent 
before (and independently of) our cognitive apprehension of it. This does 
not mean that the essence of the tree was waiting ab aeterno for our 
consciousness to apprehend it, since the traits that enter in the meaning 
‘tree’ belong to a culturally determined horizon, that we have no reason to 
‘eternalize’. But beyond the culturally shaped horizons conducive to the 
intuition of ‘trees’, there is something that can be more strictly considered 
a priori: it is the ontological positing of the relevant essence as a 
transcendent ‘thing’, endowed with identity. This is, as it were, the 
‘essence of essences’, which is operant within each pre-delineating 
horizon: it is the general thetic intention that posits what is transcendent 
as being endowed with an identity, and ‘looks for it’. As we will see, there 
is something remarkable and metaphysically unusual in this dimension of 
the Apriori. 
 At this point, we are ready to notice that the specific essences that we 
grasp in intuition can be regarded as ‘a priori’ in a third sense, which has 
nothing to do with their alleged subsistence before the founding acts of 
sensuous intuition take place: once we have grasped the essence ‘tree’, 
this specific essence acquires potential eternity, since we can recall it, 
replicate it in imagination and even transmit it to others as a stable 
acquisition (Erwerb) through multiple individuations. In this sense 
specific essences can be said to be ‘emergent’ entities: even if we do not 
have reasons to grant that the stable content obtained in the wake of 
sensuous intuition was existent ‘somewhere’ before being experienced, its 
emergence establishes its universal nature from now on. In this last sense 
essences can be regarded as transcendent because and insofar as they have 
obtained objectivity. 
 All essences are not at the same level: they can be more or less specific 
and the process of specification has a history, rooted in the passive 
syntheses of the constitution of percepts. Essences were defined from the 
start with reference to temporal change as what resists variability, first at 
the level of sensuous intuition and then at the level of full-fledged 
ideation. But what stands firm while individual experiences unfold can 
represent the stable basis for the apprehension of further stable features. If 
this is the case, we must now try to clarify what the nature of the essential 
constraints in this genetic process is. Yet, this path leads to a second more 
general question: if essences are not pre-given to the subject once and for 
all, but receive specification, and if, on the other hand, essences can be 
neither subjectively imposed on reality nor abstracted from individual 
experiences, how should we finally understand their paradoxical nature as 






§ 6. Essences and Transcendental Genesis 
 
 In a static analysis of the constitution of objects a specific essence like 
‘tree’ appears as a specification of the most general ontological region of 
‘things’. In an analytic process performed by means of eidetic variation, 
we can examine specific worldly beings and judge what can be 
imaginatively varied without them changing nature, thus recognizing their 
essence. This process can discern manifold essential thresholds, which 
can coincide with settled verbal classifications, but does not necessarily 
have to. In this sense, we can be interested in the essence of ‘table’ or 
‘tree’, and we can find a plurality of qualifying thresholds that allow us to 
determine what is essential in the relevant examples. If we proceed with 
eidetic variation up to the highest level of generality we find that both 
‘table’ and ‘tree’ are specifications in the region of ‘things’. In Husserl’s 
classification of regional ontologies ‘things’ and ‘conscious beings’ 
represent the two fundamental regions of being, which are positioned at 
the highest level of generality that we discover by applying eidetic 
variation to the real world (nature) (EJ, 435/357). Things and conscious 
beings are said to be the most basic ontological regions, but Husserl 
grants that they are the most general spheres only if we remain at a level 
still endowed with material content. If we lift their residual specificity, we 
can recognize them as belonging to a most general ontological region, 
which can be designated as ‘something in general’ (Etwas überhaupt) and 
is considered as the basis for formal ontology. Now, if we recall the three 
fundamental exemplifications of transcendence that we have previously 
mentioned, that is, Ur-hylé, material things and Alter Egos, we can 
recognize in them, under partial terminological disguise, the just 
mentioned ontological regions: ‘something in general’, things and 
conscious beings.31 Of course, the partially different labels are not 
without importance in the conceptual contexts in which the relevant 
notions are developed, but here such differences can be disregarded. Not 
surprisingly, we see that the fundamental regions of being substantially 
coincide with the most general spheres of essence and with the 
instantiations of transcendence par excellence. 
 Now, however, if we move from the classificatory intentions of static 
analysis towards the dynamic order of genetic analysis, we can remark 
that Ur-hylé, things and Alter Egos can be considered as three steps in 
genetic constitution. Indeed, as we said, we must be able to perceive 
something in general in order to grasp things, and we need to be able to 
grasp material objects in order to perceive Others. This suggests that from 
                                                 
31
 It should be noted that there is an important sense in which conscious beings and Alter 
Egos are to be conceptually kept apart: the regional ontology of conscious beings can be 
determined by opposition to things, because the focus is on ‘consciousness’ as 
differentia specifica. On the contrary, when we assume a genetic point of view we stress 
the experiential continuity between Alter Egos and material objects, since the first can be 
grasped only in the wake of the second. This point explains why in terms of regional 
ontologies things and conscious beings are put at the same level, whereas we can put 
material objects and Alter Egos in an order of genetic foundation, where the experience 
of the first grants access to the second. 
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a genetic point of view we could organize the relations between essences, 
even the most basic ones, in dynamic terms. The emphasis on a plurality 
of separate essences, which is quite justified in static terms, can make 
room for a greater attention to laws of essence (Wesensgesetze) that rule 
over the genetic constitution of spheres of being, like spatiotemporal 
reality or intersubjectivity. From this perspective we must pay more 
attention to the process that makes possible the characterization of newly 
constituted entities as essential. Indeed, if we browse through Husserl’s 
work after Ideas I we can notice that in comparison with the earlier work 
the lexical preference for the substantive form Wesen recedes in favor of 
its attributive forms (wesentlich, Wesensgesetze, wesensmäßig, etc.). This 
plausibly signals Husserl’s growing caution in using terms that could 
make think of a substantialization of essences, whereas a vision of 
essence as a characterization of being gains momentum. More precisely, 
genetic analysis, which completes (without replacing) static analysis, 
suggests a vision where essences must be conceivable as ‘moments’ in a 
developing process. This is of course no easy theoretical option for 
entities that are primarily defined in terms of a priori stability versus 
empirical change. In order to explore this view, we must pay attention for 
a moment to the general traits of transcendental genesis, as Husserl brings 
them to light. 
 Let us come back to the primal level where sensuous experience 
coalesces into unitary percepts endowed with identity. In the first pages of 
the Lectures on Time-Consciousness Husserl notices, with reference to 
the constitution of percepts, that not everything fits into the scheme 
content—apprehension (Inhalt-Auffassung) (CIT, 6/6). The point is that 
the schema content—apprehension is not up to the task of explaining the 
constitution of temporal objects.32 The active role played by apprehension 
in the constitution of meaningful perceptual units gives partially way to a 
passive process of association, governed by essential laws of genesis 
(APS, 336/624, 338/627).33 According to Husserl, the retained experience 
                                                 
32
 “Die Empfindungsdaten sind nicht ‘sozusagen fertige Gegenstände’, sondern in 
genetischer Konstitution erwachsene synthetische Einheiten. - Nach dem klassischen 
Konstitutionsschema werden formlose Stoffe, hyletische Daten, durch eine Form oder 
Morphé, eine Auffassung oder Apperzeption, beseelt und damit zu Repräsentanten von 
intentional vermeinten Gegenständlichkeiten. Die Zeitanalysen ergaben, dass diese 
schematische Konzeption von im Bewusstsein vorfindlichen formlosen, d.h. in erster 
Linie zeitformlosen Stoffen, die zur Strukturierung allererst von sinngebenden Akten 
aufgegriffen werden müssen, zu ausweglosen Widersprüchen führt.” E. Holenstein, 
Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der 
passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 107-8. 
33
 “This ‘history’ of consciousness (the history of all possible apperceptions) does not 
concern bringing to light a factual genesis for factual apperceptions or factual types in a 
factual stream of consciousness, or even in all factual human beings; thus it is not at all 
similar to the development of plant or animal species. Rather, every shape of 
apperception is an essential shape and has ist genesis in accordance with essential laws; 
accordingly, included in such an idea of apperception is that it must undergo a ‚genetic 
analysis’. And what is given is not the necessary becoming of the particular, single 
apperception (when it is understood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is only given 
with the genesis of essence; in this mode of genesis any kind of apperception of this type 
must have arisen originally (…).” (APS, 338-339/627) 
 122 
‘motivates’ the horizon of expectations directed toward the experience to 
come: retention motivates protention.34 35 The associative process that 
takes place at the primal level of passive synthesis brings forth temporal 
ordering as well as perceptual units. This notion of association must be 
carefully understood, since it is more specific than the classical notion 
promoted by ‘associationist psychology’. The most elementary level of 
association, which is mere temporal ordering, accounts for the labile 
sense of association that we find whenever something contingently 
suggests something else: I have simultaneously, or in close succession, 
perceived this smell and that image, and now the smell suggests me the 
image. However, some associations acquire a structural resilience that 
ordinary contingent associations do not have. We can undo any Pavlovian 
conditioning with relative ease and substitute it with another association, 
but we cannot with similar ease undo expectations concerning how three-
dimensional bodies appear or how harmonic sequences unfold. In order to 
distinguish contingent and essential associations Husserl speaks with 
regard to the second ones as apperceptions: the formation of 
apperceptions is regulated by laws of essence (Wesensgesetze) and the 
very essential configurations of apperception are outcomes of genesis 
(APS, 338-339/627). Apperceptions, which are constituted in the wake of 
retained experiences, are said to motivate further experiences. For Husserl 
the notion of ‘motivation’ covers the semantic area of all ‘causality by 
consciousness’ (Ideas II, 216/227): whenever something has efficacy with 
regard to ‘mental events’, this efficacy can and must be described in terms 
of motivation, never in causal terms (which is pertinent in the sphere of 
spatiotemporal events). However, the term ‘motivation’ is somehow 
ambiguous when it comes to deal with the idea of a genesis according to 
laws: the connotations of motivation effectively grasp the ‘telic’ character 
of experiential synthesis, but they do not account for another essential 
trait of genetic constitution: previous experiences provide conditions of 
possibility for further experiences. In genetic constitution some 
experiences are the precondition in order for specific other experiences to 
be accessible: remembering presupposes perceiving, like reading 
presupposes speaking or running presupposes walking. Not all 
experiences can be apprehended at any moment, but some layers of 
experience must have been apprehended in order for some other 
experience to be possible. 
 As we said before, intentionality changes over time and experience: 
intentionality is not just the presupposition of experience, but is also 
constituted by previous experience.36 Previous experience pre-delineates 
horizons of possible experiences, and this means that it also excludes 
                                                 
34
 Edmund Husserl, Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18), ed. 
by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar (Dordrecht: Springer, 2001), 18. 
35
 T. Kortooms, Phenomenology of Time. Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time-
Consciousness (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2002), 179. 
36
 Edmund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C-Manuskripte, 
Husserliana Materialien VIII, ed. by D. Lohmar (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 394. 
(Hereafter cited as: HuaMat VIII.) 
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other experiences, which turn out to be currently inaccessible; as Husserl 
writes, the free play (Spielraum) of possibilities is to be tracked back to 
the universe of actual sedimented experiences.37 In order to suggest 
together both that a layer of experience is a settled acquisition and that it 
defines a range of possibilities, Husserl introduces the term 
Vermöglichkeit, which is both an inherited asset (Vermögen) and a room 
of possibility (Möglichkeit):38 our whole life is life through 
Vermöglichkeiten, that is, through directions of intentional synthesis that 
are generated in settled experience and produce acts determining new 
horizons of possible experience (Hua XV, 203).39 Vermöglichkeiten are 
not just formal possibilities, but living possibilities, primarily embodied 
by kinaestheses, which pre-delineate certain configurations of experiences 
rather than others. 
 Now, it must not escape our attention that the notion of ‘possibility’ is 
close and akin to the notion of essence, and indeed Husserl himself in 
Ideen I, in the context of the determination of the characterizing features 
of essences, was quoting with approval the old theory that the knowledge 
of possibilities has priority over the knowledge of realities (Ideas I, 
194/190).40 Yet, later on, the experience-bound notion of Vermöglichkeit 
is actually used by Husserl to explain what possibilities, in the framework 
of a theory of knowledge, properly are: the horizon of open indeterminacy 
that circumscribes the realm of actual experience (Erfahrung) is a realm 
of possibilities tied to what is already experientially acquired.41 All 
                                                 
37
 “[D]er Spielraum der Möglichkeiten ist zurückbezogen und gebunden durch das 
Universum der geltenden ‘Wirklichkeiten’ – das wir als Universum der Bekanntheit 
bezeichnet hatten. Dieses Universum des Seinsgewissen ist natürlich ‘beweglich’. (…) 
Wir haben in der jeweiligen Bekanntheitssphäre also schlichte Gewissheiten und 
Gewissheiten aus Überwindung von Modalisierungen, aus Entscheidungen. (…) Die 
Seinsmöglichkeiten des Unbekanntheitshorizontes sind durch die bekannte Welt 
sozusagen vorgezeichnet als unbekannte Bekanntheiten, vorgezeichnet als Seiende oder 
Nichtseiende im ‘Fortgang der Erfahrung’, der von uns aus vermöglich zu dirigierenden; 
vorgezeichnet als in der Raum-Zeitlichkeit als Form vermöglicher Zugänglichkeit 
aufweisbar oder mit Aufweisbarem streitend etc.” Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der 
Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. 
Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937, Husserliana XXIX, edited by 
Reinhold N. Smid (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 64-65. Hereafter cited as “Hua XXIX.” 
38
 Vermögen primarily means just ‘being able’ or ‘being capable’, but it seems that in the 
term Vermöglichkeit the first connotation is drawn from vermöglich (wealthy), which 
suggests a metaphor based (also) on the ‘patrimonial’ acceptation of the term. 
39
 “Mein Leben ist durchaus Leben in Vermöglichkeiten, durchaus ein Leben 
intentionaler Synthesis, einer passiven Synthesis, die vielfältige Fortgangsrichtungen hat, 
in jeder Richtung, die verwirklicht wird, urzeitigend ist im urphänomenalen Strom. 
Diese passive Verlaufsstruktur <ist> aber vom wachen Ich, dem der Aktivitäten bzw. 
Vermögen, aktiv dirigiert, wobei aber alle Aktion ihren Horizont der Vermöglichkeiten 
hat” (Hua XV, 203). 
40
 “The old ontological doctrine that the cognition of ‚possibilities’ must precede the 
cognition of actualities is, in my opinion, insofar as it is correctly understood and made 
useful in the right ways, a great truth” (Ideas I, 190/194). 
41
 “Therefore, the horizon of open indeterminacy which surrounds the realm of actual 
experience is itself a realm of possibilities subject to variation, though restricted in this, 
that they are real possibilities. They are continuations of the experientially familiar into 
the unfamiliar, which however does have partial predelineation by experience, and on 
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experience (Erfahrung) of objects involves apperception, which is guided 
by a horizon that pre-delineates the experience to come, and such a 
horizon has the character of a Vermöglichkeit (Hua XV: 94).  
 The picture that emerges from these remarks is the following: 
intentionality can change over time according to the sedimentation of 
experience, which pre-delineates horizons of possible objects and 
determines their constitution. This process conditions the intuition of the 
specific essences in the hyletic-material sphere (hyletisch-sachhaltige 
Wesenssphäre), which are even labeled by Husserl with the apparent 
oxymoron ‘contingent Apriori’ (kontingentes Apriori) (FTL, 25-26/29). 
Essences like ‘tree’, or, at a more general level, ‘red’ are stable 
acquisitions, irreducible to individual experiences and intersubjectively 
transmissible; however, they also depend on experiences and on their 
temporal sedimentation.42 In this sense, we could say that (at least these) 
essences are ‘prospectively a priori’, even if they are ‘retrospectively a 
posteriori’. The hyletic-material sphere of essences is fully entitled to its 
essential characterization, because its genetic constitution does not entail 
any reduction either to individuality or to causality: each sedimentation of 
experience is a motivating possibilization, which prompts further 
experiential acquisitions and pre-delineates a range of possibilities; but 
the ensuing acquisitions are neither caused by, nor logically deduced from 
the previous steps. 
  
§ 7. The Co-essentiality of Consciousness and Being 
 
 As we previously noticed, we can read the static order of foundation 
between essences in genetic terms; for instance, the experience of Others 
(Fremderfahrung) presupposes the experience of material objects, which 
in turn presupposes the experience of something in general. We must be 
warned at this stage against the temptation of considering essences as 
something quietly residing in the mental sphere.43 As we said, the 
fundamental regions of being indicate both the most characteristic 
instantiations of transcendence and the most general level of essence. If 
transcendence is a borderline concept signaling what is given to 
consciousness as subsistent independently of consciousness, essences are 
what we grasp in the sphere of transcendence as endowed with stable 
identity. This means that essences are the ‘graspable contents’ that 
emerge from our confrontation with the irreducible ‘untamed’ sphere of 
                                                                                                                        
occasion an incompletely determined anticipation.” Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological 
Psychology, trans. J. Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 67. - 
Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, Husserliana IX, 
edited by Walter Biemel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 89. 
42
 “With each new kind of object constituted fort he first time (genetically speaking) a 
new type of object is permanently prescribed, in terms of which other objects similar to 
it will be apprehended in advance” (EJ, 34-35/38.) 
43
 When Husserl wants to thematize general notions by staying on the cognitive level, 
without ontological implications, he makes use of the term ‘Typus’ rather than ‘Wesen’. 
Indeed, in German, the term Wesen has usually also ontological connotations, since it is 
used as a synonym for ‘being’ in expressions like ‘menschliches Wesen’ (human being). 
 125 
transcendence. This confrontation takes place primarily at the level of the 
passive syntheses of perception, where originarily time and space are 
articulated and sensuous transcendence coalesces into perceptual units. At 
this primal level of experience we can conceptually distinguish three 
protagonists, which are however inseparable in act; we must have a 
motivational aspect, a transcendent moment and an essential synthesis of 
both.  
 As to the first two elements: it is clear that at first we must grant that 
our primal confrontations with sensuous transcendence have a 
fundamentally ‘telic’, motivational character. Something can be said to be 
transcendent only insofar as there is a motivation to ‘subject’ it, and such 
motivation meets ‘resistance’ of a kind. Although the intentionality of 
consciousness is to be conceptually separated from the intentionality of 
volitions, this must not conceal the fact that intentional acts have also a 
‘telic’ (‘interested’) component, even if they are passively enacted. In the 
texts of the ‘30s Husserl makes more and more often reference to the 
‘instinctual’ character of our drive to apprehend sensuous 
transcendence.44 We are constitutively oriented towards sensuous alterity, 
which prompts our kinaesthetic activity aimed at consolidating sensations 
into perceptual fields and perceptual units (HuaMat VIII, 226, 272-273). 
What affects consciousness awakens a transcendental ‘instinct of 
curiosity’ (HuaMat VIII, 323), which manifests a sort of drive towards 
objectivation (HuaMat VIII, 330). It is of the utmost importance to take 
note of the fact that, regardless of the details of the description of how 
such ‘meeting’ between transcendent reality and primal motivation takes 
place, their co-essentiality must be granted a priori. Without something 
that ‘tends towards’ (Streben), nothing can appear as autonomously given. 
This fundamental motivating factor (the striving toward explication and 
objectification) remains steady throughout the genetic process. At the 
same time, transcendent reality must be such that it can meaningfully 
affect the subject. 
 Still, this originary encounter between a living intentional act and a 
resisting and affecting alterity requires a third element in order to become 
object of cognition: the anonymous transcendence must be interpreted as 
a unitary ‘something’, that is, as an entity endowed with identity. What is 
primarily given as anonymous transcendence must be posited as a self-
contained determinable entity. This is the conceptual locus where the 
notions of essence and horizon overlap, and we can provide a chosen 
exemplification of it by looking at the notion of ‘the world’, which is 
simultaneously both motivating horizon and transcendent being. The 
world-horizon openly manifests the constituting claim that what is 
anonymously given must have unity. Indeed, the world is always already 
                                                 
44
 “Interesse an Sinnesdaten in Sinnesfeldern - vor der Objektivierung Sinnesdaten als 
Kern von Begehrungen nach Nahrung - dieser Instinkt als erster in der Ordnung der 
instinktiven Aktivitäten hat keine Objekte als thematisch zu verwirklichende. - Sollen 
wir als zweiten Urinstinkt (nach der Ordnung der Verwirklichung auf dem Weg lebendig 
begehrender Intention und Erfüllung) den Instinkt der Objektivierung setzen?” (HuaMat 
VIII, 258). 
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passively given as a determinable whole, which can be indefinitely 
articulated into material objects without ever having itself the character of 
a thing (Crisis, 146/142): the world is always all-embracing never-
actualized horizon. In this sense, the world-horizon exhibits a 
constitutively teleological nature (Hua XV, 595, 600), since it is like a 
steady demand for fulfillment and a claim for being. The transcendental 
primal instinct (Ur-instinkt) that directs us towards the affecting 
transcendence also teleologically pre-delineates its essential character.45 
This means that we turn towards what is passively given while being 
always driven by the core belief (which is also a want) that graspable 
units there are and that anonymous transcendence can be articulated into 
stable beings. Here there is no room for any opposition between an 
epistemic and an ontological dimension: the world is real and is endowed 
with essence even if this can never be the outcome of an exhaustive 
fulfillment; and indeed such non-exhaustivity will be the case in genetic 
progression for each thing in the world as well. At the most general level 
of the world, intentionality of horizon and essence overlap: they are both 
constitutive (non-arbitrary) claims of being. At more particular levels, 
when the articulating process of specification and judgment unfolds, 
identified essences can be said to prompt horizons, and horizons can be 
said to allow essences to be grasped, but the notions of horizon and 
essence diverge. The genetic process, from the earliest pre-categorical 
sedimentations to the most specific constitution of objects, consists of 
steps where specifying explications become stable acquisitions, which 
motivate and pre-delineate further acquisitions. Such further acquisitions 
require novel experience, which demands to be consistent with the settled 
acquisitions, but is neither caused nor deduced from them; therefore each 
genetic step has an exploratory character that is not pre-determined by its 
presuppositions. 
 In this conceptual framework, at the roots of the living and knowing 
process there is a structural co-essentiality between the transcendental 
and the transcendent spheres. In a paradoxical sense, we could say that 
even transcendence (before the transcendental reduction) has a 
transcendental character, insofar as what is transcendent is condition of 
possibility of all constitution and of the apprehension of essences as much 
as intentionality is. What transcends consciousness prior to the reduction 
is conducive to the genetic constitution of objects and to the grasp of 
essences no less than consciousness is. The transcendent and the 
transcendental dimensions belong together, and this necessarily suggests a 
                                                 
45
 “Nur bedenke ich aber, dass in der Rückfrage sich schliesslich die Urstruktur ergibt in 
ihrem Wandel der Urhyle etc. mit den Urkinästhesen, Urgefühlen, Urinstinkten. Danach 
liegt es im Faktum, dass das Urmaterial gerade so verläuft in einer Einheitsform, die 
Wesenform ist vor der Weltlichkeit. Damit scheint schon ‘instinktiv’ die Konstitution 
der ganzen Welt für mich vorgezeichnet, wobei die ermöglichenden Funktionen selbst 
ihr Wesens-ABC, ihre Wesensgrammatik im voraus haben. Also im Faktum liegt es, 
dass im voraus eine Teleologie statthat. Eine volle Ontologie ist Teleologie, sie setzt 
aber das Faktum voraus. Ich bin apodiktisch und apodiktisch im Weltglauben. Für mich 
ist im Faktum die Weltlichkeit, die Teleologie enthüllbar, transzendental” (Hua XV, 
385). 
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kind of ‘monistic ontology’. Yet, none of the classical monistic ontologies 
can do: absolute idealism is excluded because there is no reason to regard 
transcendence as a subjective creation, but also naturalism (objectivism, 
physicalism) is excluded, because it does not make room for the non-
bypassable and indispensable function of subjectivity. Now, the 
combination of genetic analysis and of the static description of essences 
can give us an important theoretical alternative. To recapitulate: genetic 
analysis shows how the past can provide regulatory conditions and 
qualified motivations to the present reality, without pre-determining it. 
Each genetic step is a possibilization (Ermöglichung) where motivational 
traits and transcendent aspects produce novel syntheses. But then, the 
fundamental condition for such novel syntheses to be possible is the 
sphere of essences, which, however, are not entities waiting in a parallel 
dimension for consciousness to grasp them: they are obtained through 
temporal experience, while not being reducible to individual experiences. 
And essences are not mere ‘mental events’ either, even if they are 
properly captured through a process like eidetic variation, which seems to 
demand nothing more than ‘mental experiments’ of a sort. In fact, eidetic 
variation does have an ontic tie, which is provided by the freely chosen 
examples, from which the imaginational variation starts. Such examples 
(included fictional ones) necessarily belong to the vast sphere of settled 
cognitive acquisitions: all elements occurring in fictional examples, like 
spatial and temporal determinations, forms and colors, trajectories and 
transformations, primarily emerge from our sensuous confrontation with 
transcendent ‘matter’. The phenomenal thresholds that we can detect by 
eidetic variation, and that allow us to identify essences, are always 
already the outcome of a process which is not ‘reproductively drawn from 
sensuous experiences’, but is rooted in our confrontation with sensuous 
transcendence. What is essential in essences is that they represent 
ontological thresholds separating (from a certain embodied and 
sedimented point of view) what is individual and transient from what is 
stable and therefore ‘truly existent’. From a genetic perspective essences 
do not appear as free ‘products’ of consciousness since the thresholds that 
characterize them are discovered over time and experience, and we cannot 
freely modulate them. However, essences do emerge from temporal 
experience, and they do it in a sense somehow akin to so-called 
‘emergentist ontologies’: they are novel ontological features, which are 
not reducible to their particular realizations and which exhibit a 
fundamental continuity between consciousness and being. Furthermore, 
essences are prospectively a priori (they represent a precondition for 
further experiences) even if they are retrospectively a posteriori (they are 
founded in experience).  
 Should one be tempted to say that essences are novel just with regard to 
how we apprehend them, but not in themselves, we should reply that this 
opposition of epistemological and ontological dimensions is 
phenomenologically nonsensical: essential thresholds that allow us to 
apprehend unitary entities endowed with identity are originally 
experienced at all experiential levels, and we do not have any special 
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access to an ontology that bypasses experience. From a phenomenological 
perspective ontology is signaled by transcendence, which is a way of 
givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) proper to experience. 
 As to the analogy with ‘emergent properties’, it must be noticed that 
essences could never be considered, as emergentist theories customarily 
express themselves, ‘emergent properties of matter’, because matter itself 
is already an essential acquisition requiring constitution. Essences cannot 
be said to exist either merely as ‘thought’ or as ‘matter’. What we can say 
is that, if we look at essences a parte objecti, they are primarily given as 
ontological thresholds, quanta, as it were, provided that we do not think 
of them as intrinsic features of matter. If we look at essences a parte 
subjecti, they are theses concerning transcendence that posit the existence 
of self-contained units (the world, natural things, etc.). But then: a parte 
subjecti, essences have no power to coerce the affecting transcendent 
alterity into beings, and a parte objecti, essences do not impose 
themselves on ‘unmotivated’ subjects. The fact that neither pole of 
intentional experience can ‘coerce’ the other implies that they must be 
conceived as ‘co-essential’. Thus, if we attempted to depict together 
essences a parte objecti and subjecti, we should say that essences are the 
way in which we are motivated and constitutively bound to articulate 
being, which in turn is apt to be thus articulated. 
 Should we conceive of essences, or laws of essence, in terms somehow 
akin to ‘laws of nature’? In the first place, it is important to recall that the 
necessity of essences and laws of essence is not floating in an alleged 
world of ideas. More precisely, essences are doubly tied to a paradoxical 
kind of contingency, that is, to the primal facts of hylé (Urfakta der Hylé) 
(Hua XV, 385) and to transcendental (inter)subjectivity as an Urfaktum 
(Hua XV, 386). This means that essences depend on ‘the fact that 
something is given’, which is factual in a paradoxical sense: it is the 
absolute fact (absolute Tatsache)46 that cannot be properly considered 
more contingent than necessary. Such a doubly determined absolute 
Tatsache manifests the co-originality of consciousness and being, truth 
and reality, ‘thought and matter’. If we remember how the subsistence of 
essences was initially argued for, that is, as something necessarily 
required by the very nature of truth, we can discern now the ontological 
limits of that argument: if there is truth, we said, there must necessarily be 
reality endowed with graspable essences and related laws; yet, no truthful 
judgment can predicate the necessity of Urfakta. Essences are ontological 
constraints insofar as they are examined with reference to the given all-
embracing field of phenomena: we cannot experience states of affairs that 
violate laws of essence (e.g.,: we could never accidentally meet an 
unextended color or a material thing without adumbrations, etc.). This, 
                                                 
46
 “Bauen wir im systematischen Gang die transzendentale Konstitution der 
vorgegebenen Welt von unten auf, so ist zu beachten: Natürlich ist gegenüber der 
Wesensform das Faktum des wirklichen Gehaltes in seinem strömenden Bestande in der 
je zu leistenden ‘Aufklärung’ vorausgesetzt. Das gilt ebenso selbstverständlich für das 
‘Absolute’, die transzendentale Intersubjektivität überhaupt. Das Absolute, das wir 
enthüllen, ist absolute ‘Tatsache’” (Hua XV, 403). 
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however, does not mean that essences constrain being ‘from without’, as a 
cause constrains its effect. In this sense, laws of essence cannot be read as 
laws of nature, since we are never in a position to express laws ruling 
over nature ‘in itself’ (‘trans-experiential’ being). Essences tell us how the 
world articulates into emergent units, provided that the original mergence 
of consciousness and transcendence that we call world is there (cf. Hua 
XV, 149). 
 Finally, we must directly raise the question of the kind of 
‘efficaciousness’ that can be attributed to the sphere of essences. In Ideas 
II Husserl suggests how to look at this question, when he says that the 
spirit (Geist) is efficacious on nature, although it is not efficacious in the 
sense of efficient causality.47 This means that we should not look for the 
efficaciousness of the essential sphere in the realm of natural facts, as if 
we had to point out a joint in the web of ontological connections where 
the ubiquitous working of efficient causality abdicates somehow in favor 
of a sui generis efficaciousness of essences. This kind of view assumes 
that it is more or less known what efficient causality is and how it works, 
and thus we are left with the task of discovering a special kind of 
efficaciousness irreducible to efficient causality, in order to make room 
for the ontological efficaciousness of essences. Yet, Husserl warns us that 
the efficaciousness of the spirit (or of the mind) is enigmatic precisely as 
much or as little as ordinary causality is (Ideas II, 259-260/271-272). In 
other words, Husserl reminds us of the Humean lesson, according to 
which there is no such a thing as a unitary model of causation:48 it is an 
illusion to think that we have a clear-cut and well-known picture of what 
efficient causality is, with a residual enigma concerning non-physical 
causes. On the contrary, we must keep in mind that causality has no 
intrinsic features beyond the features of the ‘causing’ event and the ones 
of the ‘caused’ event. All substantial features of causality, that is, all traits 
that allow us to say ‘how something produces something else’ or ‘what 
produces what else’ are conspicuously absent from any usual 
representation of efficient causality, which is expressed in terms of 
succession, regularity, contiguity and the like. From this point of view, we 
can see that in the framework provided by the Husserlian analysis, the 
primal way in which essences can be considered ‘efficacious’ has nothing 
to do with efficient causality. Insofar as the sphere of essences can be 
represented in terms of fundamental phenomenal thresholds, we could 
say, with some approximation, that essences are primarily efficacious in 
                                                 
47
 “As joined to Body, the spirit ‘belongs’ to nature. In spite of this association, however, 
this linkage, it is not itself nature. The spirit has ‘effects’ in nature, and yet it does not 
exercise there any causality in the sense of nature. Causality is a relation between one 
reality and its correlative surrounding realities. But the reality of the spirit is not related 
to real circumstances residing within nature; rather, it is related to real circumstances that 
exist in the ‚surrounding world’ and in other spirits: this, however, is not nature.” Ideas 
II, 283/296. For a more detailed discussion on causality and motivation see A. Zhok, “A 
Phenomenological Reading of Anomalous Monism”, in Husserl Studies, 27 (2011), 227-
256. 
48
 Cf. N. Cartwright, The Dappled World. A Study of the Boundaries of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 104 et seq. 
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the world as ‘selective principles’ that articulate how the world can be. 
Such articulation is transcendental, not causal: essential thresholds are 
conditions of possibility for the World to be, and they are conditions that 
do not belong either to consciousness or to ‘transcendent matter’ taken 
separately, but to their irreducible and original mergence. We are free to 
entertain the metaphysical speculation that there could be, or could have 
been, endless universes where consciousness (and therefore a World) 
could not subsist, but the substantial point is that, if a transcendent world 
is given, whatever it may be, it is bound to be originally articulated by 
essences. The point in the efficaciousness of the essential sphere is not to 
discover where spirit turns into matter and efficient causality (or the other 
way round): no such transition is on display. The point is that events and 
states of affairs in the world emerge by taking shape and their form (their 
essence) establishes how they can affect and be affected. In this ‘how’ is 
included all we need to make room for the efficaciousness of essences: 
should we be tempted by an interpretation in classical terms, we could say 
that here there is room for a qualified recovery of the venerable notion of 
‘formal causality’, which should be understood as irreducible to, and 
more originary than, efficient causality. 
 
